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NOTES

Religious Accommodation and
Housing
FAIR HOUSING AFTER BLOCH V. FRISCHHOLZ
Proper enforcement of the Fair Housing Act’s promise of equal
housing opportunity and of the First Amendment’s guarantee to
protect the practice of religion without the government establishing
religion can help ensure that all persons live comfortably together in
our pluralistic society and that all persons have access to safe,
decent, sanitary housing where they can exercise their right to
worship or not to worship as they choose.1

INTRODUCTION
As this quote astutely recognizes, the synergy of the
distinct goals of the Fair Housing Act2 and the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment3 has the ability to produce an
ideal situation—a nation where individuals of all religions have
access to adequate housing in a place where they are free to
exercise their religious beliefs. This utopia, however, has yet to
be achieved. More than forty years after the passing of the Fair
Housing Act, major barriers still exist and continue to be
created, preventing individuals from living in places where
they are free to act in accord with their religious beliefs. In fact,
as evidenced by Bloch v. Frischholz,4 where the Seventh Circuit
initially upheld a condominium association’s rule prohibiting
1

Michael P. Seng, The Fair Housing Act and Religious Freedom, 11 TEX. J.
C.L. & C.R. 1, 38 (2005).
2
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
3
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause states, “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
religion clauses of the First Amendment are applicable to the states via incorporation
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
4
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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the display of anything, including religiously-mandated objects,
in the doorways of the condominiums, judicial decisions have
the power to further the rift between the allied goals of the
First Amendment and the Fair Housing Act, namely providing
equal housing opportunities and religious freedom to all
Americans. Decisions such as these can, and in some cases
have, made it harder for individuals in protected classes to
obtain access to housing where they are free from religious
persecution.5 Today, some individuals in the United States are
faced with the decision of compromising their religious beliefs
or moving out of their homes.
In 1968, the Fair Housing Act was enacted as an effort
to control the pervasive discrimination in the housing market.6
Prohibiting discrimination by both public and private housing
providers, the statute lays out protected classes of individuals,
including the religiously observant, who may not be subject to
discrimination.7 Because the Fair Housing Act applies to both
public and private housing, it creates First Amendment
obligations for private entities that previously did not exist.
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses prohibit laws that burden the practice of religion and
government action which promotes religion, respectively.8 As
such, housing providers are required to provide nondiscriminatory housing in a way that neither favors nor
disadvantages the free exercise of religion.9
On July 10, 2008, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
constitutionality of a condominium association’s rule that
effectively achieves the opposite of the utopian dream described

5

See Boodram v. Md. Farms Condo., No. 93-1320, 1994 WL 31025, at *1 (4th
Cir. Feb. 1, 1994) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant condominium
association despite plaintiff’s claim that the association’s rule prohibiting storage on
condominium balconies interfered with his religious duty to display red flags, known as
“Jhandee,” as compelled by the Hindu faith); see also Savanna Club Worship Serv. v.
Savanna Club Homeowners’ Ass’n, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1224, 1234 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
(holding that homeowners’ associations have the right to prohibit religious worship in
the common areas of their communities).
6
Seng, supra note 1, at 1; see also U.S. Dep’t. of Housing and Urban Dev.,
History of Fair Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/aboutfheo/history.cfm (last
visited Aug. 30, 2009).
7
See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (stating that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or
rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental
of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”).
8
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9
Seng, supra note 1, at 1.
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above.10 In its initial review of Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), a
two-to-one decision, the court affirmed the Northern District of
Illinois’ grant of summary judgment in favor of a condominium
association whose prohibition on the placement of anything in
the doorways of the condominiums, including religiouslymandated objects, was challenged by one of the condominium
owners.11 The decision essentially held that condominium
associations may make rules that inhibit the exercise of
religion so long as the rule is “neutrally applicable.”12 In
particular, the court found that even though observant Jewish
condominium owners felt prohibited from living in their homes
once the condominium rule was interpreted to prohibit the
display of mezuzot,13 the rule was not in violation of either the
First Amendment or the Fair Housing Act, which, as currently
written, does not require accommodation for religion.14 On
November 13, 2009, six months after the Seventh Circuit
reheard the case en banc, the court decided that although the
condominium’s rule did not make the condominiums
“unavailable,” factual issues did exist with regard to the issue
of intentional discrimination, rendering total summary
judgment improper and remanding the case for further
proceedings.15
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit’s en banc
ruling in Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II) only partially remedies
the potentially harsh policy implications that could have
resulted from the circuit’s initial ruling. The en banc decision
failed to recognize that the actions taken by the condominium
10

See Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
11
Id. at 563. Judges Easterbrook and Bauer were in the majority and Judge
Wood wrote in dissent.
12
Id. at 565 (“Plaintiffs would like us to treat failure to make an
accommodation as a form of discrimination. That was one theme of Justice O’Connor’s
separate opinion in Smith—but the majority held that a neutral, exception-free rule is
not discriminatory and is compatible with the Constitution’s free exercise clause.”).
13
A mezuzah (the singular of mezuzot) is a “parchment scroll affixed to the
doorposts of a Jewish home or business” that contains portions of a Jewish prayer.
Chabad.org, Mezuzah—Definition, http://www.chabad.org/search/keyword_cdo/kid/
2891/jewish/Mezuzah.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2009). The Torah commands all Jews
to place a mezuzah on the outer doorpost of the home, and in all doorways therein, as a
reminder of the oneness of G-d and in order to protect the home and its inhabitants.
Alexander Potorak, Rooms and Doorposts, http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/
aid/256734/jewish/Rooms-and-Doorposts.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2009). Mezuzot is
the plural form of the word mezuzah. Mezuzah—Definition, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/379549/mezuzah (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
14
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 565.
15
Bloch v Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009).
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board rendered the units unavailable to observant Jews.16 Thus,
the new ruling does not completely nullify the ability of
housing associations to create rules like this in the future.
Furthermore, if on remand the issue of intentional
discrimination is not resolved in the Blochs’ favor, the door will
remain open for discriminatory housing practices to prevail.
Finally, because this decision is not binding on all federal
courts, courts outside the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit
could easily render the same mistaken ruling as the Bloch I
court, which would result in consequences inconsistent with
both the congressional intent of the Fair Housing Act and the
general common law on issues of religious accommodation in
contexts parallel to housing. In order to prevent judicial
decisions such as these from producing results adverse to those
envisioned by the legislature, it is vital that the legislature
take action to avert the disparaging consequences that would
otherwise result.
Part I of this Note discusses the factual underpinnings
of the Bloch decisions to give context to the Seventh Circuit’s
decision and the analysis contained herein. Part II briefly
discusses the historical interaction between the Fair Housing
Act and the First Amendment, focusing on how these laws
work together and affect one another. Part III analyzes the
legislative history and congressional intent of the Fair Housing
Act and examines how religious accommodation has been dealt
with in the employment context, where there is a statutorily
imposed religious accommodation requirement. This analysis
seeks to assess whether Bloch I and II were rightfully decided
and explore the potential for a religious accommodation
requirement under the Fair Housing Act in the future. Finally,
Part IV discusses the implications of the Bloch decisions and
suggests a road for moving forward. These suggestions aim to
provide a way to overcome the harsh impact that such
decisions could produce. In light of the disturbing potential
consequences of the initial decision, and the fact that these
consequences have not been completely obviated, it is
imperative that Congress act to rectify the judiciary’s failure to
protect the spirit of the Fair Housing Act.

16

Id. at 776-84.
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THE CASE: BLOCH V. FRISCHHOLZ

In a two-to-one decision in Bloch v. Frischholz, upon
first review the Seventh Circuit held that a condominium
association’s rule of not allowing anything to be placed in
condominium doorways, including religiously-mandated
objects, did not violate either the First Amendment or the Fair
Housing Act, and was therefore constitutional.17 Finding the
rule to be neutrally applicable to all condominium owners
regardless of their religious beliefs, the court affirmed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
condominium association.18 This decision is incongruous with
the legislative intent of the Fair Housing Act and the
established legal precedent in parallel contexts. These
incongruities were not completely remedied by the Seventh
Circuit’s en banc rehearing, where the court found that
although issues of fact existed as to the Blochs’ claim of
intentional discrimination, the condominium association’s rule
was not in violation of the Fair Housing Act.19
A.

Bloch v. Frischholz: The Facts

Lynne, Helen, and Nathan Bloch, observant Jews and
residents of the Shoreline Towers condominium building in
Chicago, Illinois, brought suit against the Shoreline Towers
Condominium Association and its president, Edward
Frischholz, alleging intentional discrimination in violation of
the Fair Housing Act20 and the Civil Rights Act.21 The claims
arose out of a “hallway rule” that the condominium association
adopted in September 2001, while Lynne Bloch was the chair of
the rules committee. The rule stated: “1. Mats, boots, shoes,
carts, or objects of any sort are prohibited outside Unit
entrance doors. 2. Signs or name plates must not be placed on
Unit doors.”22 The rule did not become problematic until 2004,
when the association began to interpret the rule as prohibiting

17
18
19
20
21
22

Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 565.
Id. at 564-65.
Bloch II, 587 F.3d 771.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(b), 3617 (2006).
Id. § 1982; Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 569 (Wood, J. dissenting).
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J. dissenting).
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the placement of mezuzot on the exterior doorposts of the
units.23
During a renovation of the hallways of the Shoreline
Towers in May 2004, the residents were instructed to remove
all items from their doors so that construction could be
completed.24 The Blochs complied, and once the renovations
were completed, proceeded to reaffix their mezuzah to the
entrance of their unit.25 Shortly thereafter, the condominium
association began removing and confiscating mezuzot from
entranceways in the building, claiming that they were in
violation of the hallway rule.26 Previously, the rule had only
been used to prevent clutter in the hallway as well as “signs
and name plates” as explicitly stated, but not mezuzot.27
However, despite plaintiffs’ objections, explaining the religious
significance and importance of the mezuzah, the condominium
association offered no relief. Instead, the condominium
association continually removed plaintiffs’ mezuzot and
threatened monetary penalties if they continued to affix a
mezuzah in their doorway.28
After the death of Marvin Bloch, Lynne’s husband and
Helen and Nathan’s father, the Blochs specifically requested
permission to display a mezuzah in accordance with Jewish
mourning rituals.29 Despite their request, the condominium
association removed their mezuzah during this traumatic
time.30 Debra Glassman, another Shoreline Towers resident and
observant Jew, was treated in a similar fashion, forcing her to
move out of her unit.31 She felt that “she had essentially been
evicted from her home,” because the condominium association
prevented her from displaying her mezuzah as required by the
laws of her religion.32
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 568.
32
Id.; see also Deuteronomy 6:5-9 (instructing all Jews that “[y]ou shall write
[the commandments] on the doorposts of your house and on your gates”). Both orthodox
and non-orthodox Jews affix the prayer to their doorpost, as required, in a mezuzah.
Dennis W. Carlton & Avi Weiss, The Economics of Religion, Jewish Survival, and
Jewish Attitudes Toward Competition in Torah Education, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 263
n.27 (2001). Mezuzot are required because they serve as a constant reminder of the
24
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In the aftermath, Lynne Bloch proposed an amendment
to the hallway rule that would allow mezuzot to be displayed on
exterior doorways, to no avail.33 In December 2006, the Blochs
filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois.34 Before the Blochs
filed their suit, however, the Shoreline Towers Condominium
Association’s board adopted a religious exception to the hallway
rules.35 Thus, the relief sought by the Blochs merely consisted of
damages for the distress suffered before the exception was
enacted, as well as an injunction to prevent the association
from restoring the old interpretation of the rule.36 Additionally,
about a year before the Blochs filed their complaint, the city of
Chicago enacted an ordinance prohibiting residential building
owners from restricting the placement of religious objects in
the doorways of homes, unless necessary to avoid property
damage or undue hardship to other unit owners.37 This
ordinance made it illegal for the Association to revert to its
prior version of the rule. Thus, the Blochs’ suit essentially only
involved a quest for damages, allowing the issue raised by the
Blochs to remain ripe for adjudication.38
B.

Bloch v. Frischholz: The Suit

The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the condominium association and Frischholz based on the
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Halprin v. Prairie Single Family
Homes of Dearborn Park Association,39 and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed.40 Writing for the circuit court, Chief Judge Frank
Easterbrook explained that Halprin stood for the proposition
that harassment of owners or tenants, even though religiously
motivated, was not a Fair Housing Act violation.41 Only when
“Divine Presence and of the obligation to observe all the commandments.” James D.
Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CALI. L. REV. 91, 106 n.123 (1991);
supra note 13.
33
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 568 (Wood, J. dissenting).
34
Bloch v. Frischholz, No. 06-C-4472, 2008 WL 244287 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24,
2008).
35
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 563.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 564; see also CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 05-8-030(H) (2005).
38
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 564.
39
388 F.3d 327, 328-30 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Fair Housing Act
was not violated by religiously-based harassment of homeowners because it was not
discrimination in the “sale or rental” of a dwelling).
40
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 565.
41
Id. at 563.
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the harassment is so severe as to amount to constructive
eviction can a violation be found.42 Finding the hallway rule
neutral with respect to religion because it was generally
applicable to all condominium owners, the court held that a
determination of whether the rule resulted in the constructive
eviction of the Blochs was unnecessary.43 Finally, the court
explained that it saw the suit as seeking a religious exception
to a neutral rule—a religious accommodation—something not
required by the language of the Fair Housing Act.44 Because the
Fair Housing Act sees discrimination as more than a “failure to
accommodate,” the court found no violation of the Fair Housing
Act or the First Amendment in Shoreline Towers’ refusal to
accommodate the religious beliefs of the Jewish homeowners.45
In a vehement dissent, Judge Diane Wood disagreed
with the majority’s grant of summary judgment.46 She noted
that the court wrongly framed the issue on appeal and thus did
not properly address the claims asserted by the plaintiffs.47
According to Judge Wood, instead of viewing the Blochs’ claim
as a quest for religious accommodation, the court should have
reached the question of whether the inability to display a
mezuzah in one’s doorway resulted in the constructive eviction
of observant Jewish residents, and should have found that
plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to prove constructive
eviction.48 Judge Wood found the hallway rule to be the
equivalent of a sign outside the building reading “No observant
Jews allowed,” and as such, the situation presented in the case
was exactly that imagined by Fair Housing Act’s Section
3604(a) as interpreted in Halprin.49 Furthermore, Judge Wood
42

Id. at 564.
Id.
44
Id. at 565 (explaining that the language of the Fair Housing Act only
requires accommodations for handicaps and not for religion or the other classes
protected by the Act).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 566.
47
Id. (The Court addressed the issue of whether the condominium
association had a duty to accommodate plaintiffs’ religious beliefs rather than
analyzing the actual issue, that is, whether the association intentionally discriminated
against plaintiffs based on their religious beliefs.).
48
Id. at 570.
49
Id. In Halprin, the Seventh Circuit found that religiously motivated
harassment of owners and tenants did not to violate the Fair Housing Act after it gave
a limited interpretation of Section 3604(b) and refused to look beyond the plain
meaning of the words contained in the statute. See Bloch, 533 F.3d at 563; see also
Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir.
2004) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant homeowners’ association,
43
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noted that the Section 3604(b) claim asserted by the Blochs
was factually sufficient because the Fair Housing Act
prohibited, among other things, religious discrimination in “the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,”
and the agency responsible for regulating the implementation
of the Fair Housing Act, the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), had interpreted
this language to protect “an owner, tenant, or a person
associated with him or her.”50
Judge Wood argued that summary judgment was
incorrect because the question of whether the hallway rule
applied to mezuzot was both material and in dispute.51 Thus,
the majority’s characterization of the rule as being facially
neutral was improper, since that would require a finding that
the rule does include a prohibition on the display of mezuzot.52
According to Judge Wood, the whole point of the case is that
the Association took a neutral rule and started interpreting it
in a way that exclusively affected observant Jewish owners.53 In
such a situation, it is not just the fact that a rule is neutral
that is of importance. Rather, she argued that it is necessary to
assess whether the rule “target[s] the practices of a particular
religion for discriminatory treatment” in order to determine if
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has been
violated.54 In Judge Wood’s opinion, this was exactly the
situation at bar—the rule may have been facially neutral, but
it had a disparate impact on observant Jews, therefore
invaliding its neutrality.55 Finally, Judge Wood opined that the
Blochs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was also sustainable.56

and finding that religious harassment of plaintiff homeowners by association president
did not violate § 3604(b) because it was not harassment that “prevented [people] from
acquiring property” since the couple already owned their home).
50
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 570-71 (Wood, J., dissenting); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)
(2008); 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (2008).
51
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 572 (Wood, J., dissenting).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 573 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 557 (1993)).
55
Id.
56
Id. Judge Wood explained that the Blochs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982
was also sustainable because the language of the statute leads to the same end result
as would be the outcome under the Fair Housing Act claims. Under Section 1982 or the
Fair Housing Act, the Blochs must prove intentional discrimination, an issue of which
they have provided ample evidence, surely enough to withstand a motion for summary
judgment from the association. Id.
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On May 13, 2009, the Seventh Circuit reheard the
Blochs’ case en banc.57 The United States government felt so
strongly that the Seventh Circuit erred in its initial ruling that
it submitted an amicus brief urging the en banc panel to
reverse and remand the case.58 In its brief, the government
argued that the Seventh Circuit’s ruling is out of line with the
congressional intent of the Fair Housing Act and that summary
judgment was inappropriate because enough questions of fact
existed to make the case ripe for jury determination as to the
existence of discrimination.59 The government conceded that the
text of the Fair Housing Act does not currently require
religious accommodation, but remained silent on the issue of
whether such a clause is inferred by the spirit of the Act or the
Constitution.60
Six months after hearing the case en banc, the Seventh
Circuit partially amended its initial ruling.61 The en banc court
saw the case as presenting two distinct issues. The first issue
was which, if any, of the Fair Housing Act provisions could be a
potential source of relief for the Blochs.62 The second issue was
whether the Blochs put forth sufficient evidence of
discrimination to create an issue of fact to be resolved at trial.63
As to the first issue, the court looked at whether the Fair
Housing Act can afford relief for claims of post-sale
discrimination.64 While the court acknowledged that Section
3604(a) can be violated post-acquisition in extreme cases of
“constructive eviction,” it found that the condominium at issue
here was never actually made “unavailable” to the Blochs, and
therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment on this
issue.65 On the issue of intentional discrimination, the court
57

Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009). For an audio
version of the argument, see 2009 WL 1472344.
58
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants Urging Reversal and Remand on Fair Housing Act Claims, Bloch v.
Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376).
59
Id. at *13-14.
60
Id. at *43-44. This Note seeks to argue that although the Fair Housing Act
does not contain a religious accommodation clause, such a clause is necessary for the
Act to be congruent with the congressional intent of the statute, the First Amendment,
and how religious accommodation is handled in parallel contexts, namely employment
under Title VI. See infra Part III.A-C.
61
Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 787.
62
Id. at 775.
63
Id. at 775-76.
64
Id. at 775.
65
Id. at 777-78 (“To establish a claim for constructive eviction, a tenant need
not move out the minute the landlord’s conduct begins to render the dwelling
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found that the Blochs had presented sufficient evidence of
genuine issues of fact to warrant a trial.66 Consequently, the
district court’s grant of summary judgment and the circuit
panel’s affirmation was reversed, and the Blochs’ case was
remanded.67
II.

THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, or the Fair Housing
Act,68 was enacted in 1968 during the height of the Civil Rights
Movement, and in the aftermath of the assassination of Martin
Luther King, Jr., as a congressional effort to curb rampant
discrimination in the housing market.69 The Act prohibits
discrimination in the sale, rental, and housing provisions of
both public and private housing providers, subject to certain
exemptions,70 on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, [and] national origin.”71 Through the inclusion of
religion in the list of protected classes, the drafters implicated
the First Amendment in the Fair Housing Act’s
interpretation.72 Although the First Amendment generally
applies only to public entities, because the Fair Housing Act
outlaws discrimination in both private and public housing, it
effectively creates First Amendment obligations for private
housing authorities. Therefore, in applying the Fair Housing
Act, a delicate balance must be struck between neither favoring
nor disadvantaging religion, as mandated by the First
Amendment.73
uninhabitable—in this case, when the defendants began enforcing the Hallway Rule to
take down the Blochs’ mezuzot. Tenants have a reasonable time to vacate the premises.
Nonetheless, it is well-understood that constructive eviction requires surrender of
possession by the tenant. Still, the Blochs never moved out.” (internal citations
omitted)).
66
Id. at 785 (“Although the Blochs’ case is no slam dunk, we think the record
contains sufficient evidence, with reasonable inferences drawn in the Blochs’ favor,
that there are genuine issues for trial on intentional discrimination.”).
67
Id. at 787.
68
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
69
Seng, supra note 1, at 1; see also U.S. Dep’t. of Housing and Urban Dev.,
History of Fair Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/aboutfheo/history.cfm (last
visited Aug. 30, 2009).
70
See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b).
71
Id. § 3604(a)-(b).
72
See, e.g., id. § 3604(a) (stating that it is unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent
after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of,
or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”).
73
Seng, supra note 1, at 1.
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Congress intended the Fair Housing Act to “provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout
the United States,”74 in an effort to promote racially integrated
housing.75 Although primarily designed as a remedial tool to
deal with segregated housing patterns in the United States,76
the statute not only sought fair housing for individuals
discriminated against on the basis of race, but also took on the
broader task of providing fair housing to other individuals who
are likely to be the subject of discrimination.77 Both the
Department of Justice, by way of the Attorney General, and
individuals are eligible to bring suit under the Fair Housing
Act.78 However, while individuals are only required to show
that they have been victims to an illegal housing practice, the
Department of Justice must point to a “pattern or practice” of
discrimination in order to establish a cause of action.79
The Supreme Court has had surprisingly minimal
interaction with substantive Fair Housing Act claims in the
forty years since its enactment.80 Circuit courts, however, have
had extensive engagement with Fair Housing claims and have
developed standards under which evaluation of such claims are
to be assessed. Specifically, these courts have determined that
violations of the Fair Housing Act can be established on one of
two grounds—disparate impact or disparate treatment.81
Generally, to establish a disparate impact claim, a
claimant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination,
demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct has a
discriminatory effect.82 More specifically, a claimant must prove
that the challenged practice “actually or predictably” results in

74

42 U.S.C. § 3601.
Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973).
76
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. Housing and Civil Enforcement
Section, The Fair Housing Act, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/housing_coverage.htm
(last visited Aug. 30, 2009) [hereinafter The Fair Housing Act].
77
See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”).
78
See id. §§ 3613-14.
79
The Fair Housing Act, supra note 76.
80
Supreme Court cases on the Fair Housing Act have mostly been limited to
addressing procedural issues such as standing under the Fair Housing Act. See Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 (1981); Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 93 (1978); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972).
81
Leblanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 425 (2d Cir. 1995).
82
This is similar to the requirement for alleging a cause of action under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir.
1974); see also infra Part III.C.
75
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discrimination based on one of the prohibited classifications.83 A
claimant need not show that such action is discriminatorily
motivated, but merely that the defendant’s action has a
discriminatory effect.84 For these types of claims, a claimant is
required to prove a “causal connection” between the
questionable policy and the resulting disparate impact on the
protected group.85
Alternatively, Fair Housing Act violations can be
established based on a disparate treatment theory. Under this
theory, a claimant can establish a prima facie showing of
discrimination by “showing that animus against the protected
group ‘was a significant factor in the position taken.’”86
Allegations of discriminatory intent must be analyzed based on
the totality of the circumstances, taking into account the fact
that some “law[s] bear more heavily” on one group of people
than others.87 Other factors considered in this analysis are the
historical background of the decision, the events leading up to
the decision, and statements made by individuals involved in
the decision-making.88
The type of evidence used to make out a claim of
religious discrimination under the Fair Housing Act is the
same type used in assessing the religious animus of a law for
the purpose of assessing its constitutionality under the First
Amendment.89 Therefore, claims of religious discrimination in
the sale, rental, or privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling
lead to the intersection of the Fair Housing Act and the First
Amendment.90 Under the First Amendment, in order for a
facially neutral rule to constitutionally prohibit conduct that
inhibits the practice of religion, there must be a religiously

83

United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir.
1975); see also United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach,
493 F.2d 799, 808 (5th Cir. 1974).
84
City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d at 1184-85.
85
Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 712 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Lopez
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1991)).
86
Leblanc-Sternberg, 67 F.3d at 425 (quoting United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1226 (2d Cir. 1987)).
87
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
88
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68
(1977).
89
Leblanc-Sternberg, 67 F.3d at 426 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993)). Specifically, this type of evidence is
used to prove religious animus for disparate treatment claims. See id.
90
See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b) (2006); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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neutral reason to justify the rule.91 Thus, claims of religious
discrimination brought under the Fair Housing Act necessarily
implicate the right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed
by First Amendment.92
III.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISSTEP: ANALYSIS OF BLOCH

The Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Bloch I and II were
wrongly decided for a number of reasons. To begin, the court’s
consistent conclusion that the Fair Housing Act does not
require accommodation for religion fails to look beyond the
words of the statute in assessing its applicability to the
situation faced by the Blochs. In addition, the Bloch I panel’s
classification of the hallway rule in question as neutrallyapplicable, and thus consistent with the requirements of the
First Amendment, fails to consider disparate impact analysis.93
Furthermore, the decision is inconsistent with how religious
accommodation has been dealt with in the parallel context of
workplace discrimination. Finally, the policy implications of
the initial holding are problematic, and have vast consequences
for the future of the housing market that the en banc ruling did
not ameliorate. Depending on how the case is decided on
remand and whether other circuits follow the rehearing of the
Seventh Circuit’s initial ruling, the private housing market
may now be able to effectively exclude protected classes,
making the Fair Housing Act’s goal of rendering adequate
housing to all individuals, regardless of their religious beliefs,
unachievable.
Part A of this Section discusses why the congressional
intent of the Fair Housing Act requires religious
accommodation, despite the absence of explicit language to this
effect. Part B analyzes the need for a religious accommodation
clause under the Fair Housing Act because of the First
Amendment implications in the absence of such a requirement.
Next, Part C assesses how religious accommodation is dealt
with under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, where religious
accommodation is statutorily mandated, in an effort to prove
that such a requirement is consistent with First Amendment
jurisprudence in the employment context. Finally, Part D looks
91

See Church of Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 531-32.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
93
See Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 573 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood,
J., dissenting), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
92
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at disparate impact analysis to show why the Seventh Circuit
twice erred in its failure to assess the Blochs’ claim on these
grounds.
A.

Reconciling Bloch and the Congressional Intent of the
Fair Housing Act

The Fair Housing Act does not contain an explicit
requirement that public or private housing providers make
accommodations for religious individuals.94 But looking beyond
the plain meaning of the words contained in the Act—to the
congressional intent in enacting this legislation—reveals that
such a requirement is essential in order for the Act to achieve
its stated goals.95 Expanding the scope of statutory
interpretation afforded to the Fair Housing Act by the Seventh
Circuit exposes the fact that its narrow reading fails to give
proper breadth to the Act, and consequently fails to grant relief
to those individuals who are harmed by housing providers’
failure to make reasonable accommodations for the religiously
observant. These results are in direct conflict with the spirit of
the Act, and its ability to “provide . . . for fair housing
throughout the United States.”96 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has itself endorsed a liberal reading of the Act, providing more
evidence that the Seventh Circuit’s narrow interpretation was
mistaken.97
When the Fair Housing Act was enacted in 1968, it only
prohibited discrimination in the “sale, rental and financing” of
housing on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.”98 In 1988, the Fair Housing Act was amended to
increase the number of protected classes and to provide better
guidelines for enforcement of the statute and the rights
provided therein.99 The amendments extended the guarantees
of the statute to cover individuals with disabilities and to
protect against discrimination on the basis of familial status.100
Initially, the statute contained no mention of the concept of
“accommodation” for any of the protected classes, but with the
94

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619; see also Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 565; Hack v.
President of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
95
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
96
42 U.S.C. § 3601.
97
See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
98
The Fair Housing Act, supra note 76.
99
Id.
100
Id.
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1988 amendment, a clause was added that stated that “a
refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling,” constituted discrimination against
individuals on the basis of a handicap.101 Accordingly,
accommodations for handicapped individuals must be made
where the modification is necessary for the individual to use
and fully enjoy the dwelling and the modification does not pose
an undue cost or administrative burden.102
Although the accommodation clause of the Fair Housing
Act appears only under the requirements for providing housing
to individuals with handicaps, whether this distinction was
intended is unclear. Specifically, it is unclear whether Congress
intended for the accommodation language to apply
retroactively to all forms of discrimination prohibited by the
statute. In fact, there are indications that this intent was
present, since to provide otherwise would inhibit the stated
purpose of the statute, “to provide . . . for fair housing
throughout the United States.”103
In Bloch I, the Seventh Circuit indicated that because
the word “accommodate” only appears under the requirements
for handicaps, Congress intended the word “discriminate” to
have a distinctly different meaning than “failure to
accommodate.”104 However, although the Seventh Circuit is
correct that the statutory language does not equate
“discrimination” and “failure to accommodate,” and that not all
failures to accommodate would rise to the level of
discrimination, there may be instances where a failure to
accommodate does reach the level of discrimination. Thus, the
question of whether an accommodation requirement does, or
should, exist for the protected class of religious individuals
becomes central to analyzing whether the conduct of the
Shoreline Towers Condominium Association rose to the level of
101

42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
The cost of the accommodation must also be paid for by the individual
requiring the modification. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(A)-(B).
103
Id. § 3601(1).
104
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7 Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“It would be especially
inappropriate to adopt in the name of the Fair Housing Act a principle that lack of
accommodation = discrimination, since the FHA itself distinguishes the two. By
requiring accommodation of handicap but not race, sex, or religion, the statute’s
structure tells us that the FHA uses the word ‘discriminate’ to mean something other
than ‘failure to accommodate.’”).
102
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discrimination. By incorrectly granting summary judgment,
the Seventh Circuit did not reach this key question.
Case law in the Seventh Circuit is consistent with this
narrow interpretation of the language of the Fair Housing Act,
but Supreme Court precedent is not. The Seventh Circuit has
routinely refused to look beyond the words of the Fair Housing
Act to the legislative history to give additional breadth to the
statute.105 In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that the
Fair Housing Act should be interpreted broadly and has looked
to the legislative history in assessing procedural Fair Housing
Act questions.106 It is reasonable, therefore, to suggest that the
congressional intent of the statute may require a broader
interpretation of the statute’s language than the words alone
may indicate.
The Blochs’ request to display their mezuzah may be
construed as a request for an accommodation to a facially
neutral rule. Although a right to accommodation is not
explicitly conferred in the statute, such a right may be implicit,
given the law’s purpose. To begin, the Blochs merely requested
the right to display their mezuzah in their doorway.
Accommodation of this request would not cost the
condominium
association
any
money,
present
any
administrative burden to change the rule, nor make an
exception for the display of religiously-mandated objects.107 In
105

See, e.g., Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n,
388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Reference to legislative history is criticized when it
is used to give a statute a reach that exceeds what its words suggest. Our use here is
the opposite; it is to confirm that the words mean what they seem to mean.”). It is a
Seventh Circuit trend to advocate for “plain meaning” interpretation of statutes. Judge
Easterbrook, who writes for the majority in Bloch I, routinely advocates for narrowing
the scope of statutory interpretation with his philosophy of “new textualism.”
Easterbrook believes that “it is misleading to speak of legislative intent,” and, as a
result, he has advocated for “a limit on the use of legislative history.” James E.
Westbrook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and Collective Bargaining
Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60 MO. L. REV. 283, 287-88 (1995). Similarly,
Judge Posner has “caution[ed] against judicial reliance upon broad statutory purpose.”
Id.
106
See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995)
(noting awareness of “the [Fair Housing] Act’s stated policy ‘to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States’” and
“precedent recognizing the FHA’s ‘broad and inclusive’ compass, and therefore
according a ‘generous construction’ to the Act’s complaint-filing provision”) (quoting
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972) (assessing the standing
of complainants to bring suits under the Fair Housing Act)); see also Griffen v.
Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1971) (acknowledging that the Court has broadly
interpreted all civil rights statutes).
107
The requested accommodation therefore meets the statutory requirements
for accommodation as laid out for handicaps. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A)-(B).
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addition, failure to accommodate this request prevents the
Blochs from “enjoy[ing their] dwelling,”108 further rendering it
unusable to them. The words of the Fair Housing Act explicitly
state that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent . . . or
otherwise make unavailable” a dwelling on the basis of
religion.109 Contrary to the holding in Bloch II,110 the Shoreline
Towers Condominium Association’s hallway rule effectively
made the condominiums unavailable to observant Jewish
individuals who are required by the tenets of their religion to
display a mezuzah in the doorway of their homes. Although the
Blochs did not move out of their condo, as the Seventh Circuit
asserts would necessarily need to be shown here for a claim of
constructive eviction,111 the hallway rule’s treatment of
observant Jews is discrimination on the basis of religion—the
exact conduct the Fair Housing Act prohibits.112 In fact, despite
the finding that the Blochs’ home was not made “unavailable,”
the court in Bloch II specifically acknowledged that “Section
3604(a) is designed to ensure that no one is denied the right to
live where they choose for discriminatory reasons,”113 a
proposition aptly describing the situation facing the Blochs. If a
facially neutral rule results in a discriminatory impact on
people’s religion, there should be a cause of action under the
Fair Housing Act, even if no duty exists to accommodate for
religious observance.114
108

Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
Id. § 3604(a) (emphasis added). The full text of this clause states that it
shall be unlawful, “To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.” Id.
110
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2009); see
supra note 62 and accompanying text. The en banc decision asserts that “[w]hether
‘unavailability’ means that a plaintiff must, in every case, vacate the premises to have
a § 3604(a) claim is an issue we refrain from reaching.” Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 778. Yet
despite this statement, that is precisely the onus put on the Blochs, as the court noted
“the Blochs never moved out [and] gave no reason why they failed to vacate,” and
concluded that “based on these facts, we see no possibility that a reasonable jury could
conclude that the defendants’ conduct rendered Shoreline Towers ‘unavailable’ to the
Blochs.” Id.
111
Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 777-78; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
112
The en banc decision noted that “if the Blochs produced sufficient evidence
of discrimination, we conclude that § 3604(b) could support the Blochs’ claim,” yet the
court never reached this issue. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 781.
113
Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 776 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210
(7th Cir. 1984)).
114
See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 103-04 (2d Cir.
2000) (Moran, J., dissenting) (asserting that although the college may not be compelled
109
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Similarly, the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to
“coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in
the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected
by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of [the Act].”115 Section
3604 makes it unlawful to discriminate against individuals in
the sale, rental, and privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling on
the basis of religion.116 Seventh Circuit case law interpreting
this clause of the Fair Housing Act has prohibited harassment
that amounts to constructive eviction, analogizing such conduct
to constructive discharge, which is prohibited under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.117 In the case of the Blochs, their inability
to display their mezuzah in their doorway was constructive
eviction because they were no longer able to live in their
condominium and simultaneously adhere to the rules of their
religion. At least one other tenant in Shoreline felt similarly, as
she moved out and told her neighbors that she had “essentially
been evicted from her home.”118 Because of Shoreline’s
persistent removal of the mezuzot from the Blochs’ doorway
and prevention of Lynn’s display of a mezuzah while she was
mourning the death of her husband, these actions may be
classified as harassment and result in a cause of action under
the Fair Housing Act, which various courts in the country have
allowed.119
Finally, although § 3604 does not explicitly address
post-acquisition discrimination,120 hindrance of one’s ability to
by the Fair Housing Act to make religious accommodations, where plaintiff makes a
prima facie showing of the unavailability of housing to observant Jewish students, the
case should proceed to discovery and be left to the fact finder to determine whether the
rule has had a discriminatory effect).
115
42 U.S.C. § 3617.
116
Id. § 3604(a)-(b).
117
DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996). For a more indepth discussion of the parallels between Title VII constructive discharge claims and
the potential for creating a Title VII constructive eviction cause of action, see infra Part
III.C.
118
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood, J.,
dissenting), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir 2009) (en banc).
119
DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008 (noting that several other courts have found
harassment to be an actionable form of housing discrimination (citing Beliveau v.
Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1396-97 (C.D. Cal. 1995); People v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp.
1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1988))).
120
In Bloch II, the Seventh Circuit created a case for a claim of postacquisition discrimination under § 3604 when it noted that, “[a]s a purely semantic
matter the statutory language [of Section 3604(a)] might be stretched far enough to
reach a case of ‘constructive eviction.’” Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 776
(7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Halprin v. Prairie Single
Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004)). The court
went on to explicitly state that “§ 3604(a) may reach post-acquisition discriminatory
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enjoy the rights guaranteed in this section can take place after
acquisition of the dwelling, creating a cause of action under
§ 3617, which prohibits coercion, intimidation, and interference
with one’s enjoyment of his dwelling.121 While the Seventh
Circuit has “routinely reserved” the issue of whether a plaintiff
may assert a cause of action under § 3617 even in the absence
of violations of §§ 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606,122 at least two
courts have found a valid cause of action in these
circumstances.123 Furthermore, as the United States pointed out
in its amicus brief to the Seventh Circuit prior to the en banc
re-hearing, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development has itself interpreted the Fair Housing Act to
apply to “post-acquisition discrimination.”124 Affording Chevron
deference to HUD’s interpretation of the Fair Housing Act
forces the conclusion that “post-acquisition discrimination” is
protected under the Act.125
Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s consideration of the Blochs’
Fair Housing Act claims in both Bloch I and II wrongly
affirmed the grant of summary judgment because they failed to
fully and properly consider the various theories discussed
herein that would support a cause of action for discrimination
under the Fair Housing Act. A look into the congressional
intent of the Fair Housing Act reveals that, in order to achieve
the stated goal of the statute, a broader interpretation of the
statutory language is necessary.126 The discriminatory
conduct that makes a dwelling unavailable to the owner or tenant, somewhat like a
constructive eviction.” Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 776. However, finding no “unavailability”
here, the Blochs’ claim under § 3604(a) was dismissed.
121
See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
122
Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 781.
123
See United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978-79 (D. Neb. 2004);
Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Additionally, in Bloch II,
the Seventh Circuit stated that “a § 3617 claim might stand on its own,” and in
applying that idea to the Blochs, noted that a claim under this section could only
prevail after proof of intentional discrimination, an issue remanded for determination
at trial. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 782-83. Once discrimination was established, the Blochs
would be able to proceed under § 3617, but that issue has yet to be reached. Id.
124
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants Urging Reversal and Remand on Fair Housing Act Claims at 32, Bloch v.
Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376) (citing 24 C.F.R. 100.400(c)(2)
and 24 C.F.R. 100.65(b)(4)).
125
Id. at 33 (citing Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984)). Chevron sets forth a legal test for determining whether deference should
be given to a government agency’s interpretation of their statutory law. See Chevron,
467 U.S. 837. Deference is given to the agency when a statute is ambiguous and the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable. See id.
126
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of expanding the scope
of interpretation of the Civil Right Act of 1964. See Griffen v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S.
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treatment to which the Blochs were subject is exactly the type
of conduct that the Fair Housing Act seeks to prohibit, and by
granting summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit effectively
undermined the ability of the Fair Housing Act to “provide . . .
fair housing throughout the United States.”127
B.

The Necessity for Religious Accommodation Under the
First Amendment

While the Fair Housing Act may not explicitly require
religious accommodation, the question of whether the First
Amendment requires such an accommodation in the housing
context is a separate but equally important issue. As discussed
in Part II, the First Amendment is implicated here because
housing discrimination occurred on the basis of religion.
Analyzing how courts have dealt with religious accommodation
in other contexts sheds some light on whether the situation in
Bloch was appropriately analyzed under the First Amendment.
First Amendment jurisprudence, specifically the religious
accommodation requirement of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act,128 demonstrates that not only would a parallel requirement
under the Fair Housing Act be constitutional, but it would also
further the Act’s goals. In failing to recognize the necessity of a
religious accommodation requirement under the First
Amendment, the Seventh Circuit panel in Bloch I rashly and
inappropriately granted summary judgment, and only partially
nullified the effects of this harsh judgment in Bloch II by
remanding the case in part, underscoring the need for action.
The religion line of the First Amendment is generally
analyzed as two separate clauses—the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause.129 The Free Exercise Clause
prohibits the creation of laws that burden the practice of

88, 97-98 (1971) (acknowledging that the Court has broadly interpreted Civil Rights
statutes); see also supra note 106 and accompanying text.
127
42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). While Bloch II leaves open the possibility for the
Blochs to establish claims under § 3604(b) and § 3617 if a finding of intentional
discrimination is made on remand, no relief is presently available to the Blochs under
the Fair Housing Act without further litigation pending a favoring outcome on remand.
Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 781, 783.
128
Id. § 2000e-1 to -17.
129
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment state, “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first ten words of the Amendment have been deemed
the “Establishment Clause” and the remainder the “Free Exercise Clause.” See Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947).
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religion, while the Establishment Clause prohibits the
government from promoting or showing favoritism towards one
religion.130 When a law places an incidental burden on the
practice of religion, the Free Exercise Clause merely requires
that such a law be neutral and generally applicable in order to
be deemed constitutional.131 When this test cannot be met and a
law is not religiously neutral, the government must prove that
the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government
interest and is narrowly-tailored to meet this interest.132
Finally, the government must prove that the achievement of
the interest at stake would be undermined by the creation of a
religious exception to the rule.133 Similarly, the Establishment
Clause forbids a law from promoting or disadvantaging any
particular religion.134 The Supreme Court has stated that there
are three ways of proving that a law suppresses religion or
religious conduct: (1) the law is facially biased; (2) the law
targets one or more religious groups; or (3) the law prohibits
more conduct than is necessary to achieve the stated
compelling government interest.135
The Shoreline Towers Condominium Association rule
violates the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and may
be deemed unconstitutional under two of the theories that the
Supreme Court has approved for proving that the purpose of a
law is to suppress religious conduct. First, the condominium
rule targets a religious group. While not expressly targeting
Jews, the rule effectively prohibits observant Jews from living
at Shoreline Towers in accordance with the tenets of their
religion. As Justice Wood pointed out in her dissent in Bloch I,
just as a rule that forbids individuals from wearing
headscarves in the common areas of the condominium would
single out observant Muslim women whose religion requires
them to cover their heads, so too does the prohibition of the
display of religiously mandated objects in the doorways of one’s
home disproportionately affect observant Jews.136 Second, the
130
131

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79

(1990).
132

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 530

(1993).
133

Id.
Id. at 532 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990)).
135
See id. at 533-38.
136
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 573 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood, J.,
dissenting) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
134
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hallway rule prohibits more conduct than is necessary to
achieve the Association’s stated goal of maintaining an
attractive hallway appearance.137 This objective could be
achieved by less restrictive means. Moreover, it could be
achieved even if there was a religious exception to the rule
permitting Jews or any other religious group that requires such
an accommodation to display mezuzot or the like in their
doorways.
In sum, the condominium association rule violates the
Free Exercise Clause under the factors enumerated by the
Supreme Court. On the other hand, a religious accommodation
requirement in the housing context would be constitutionally
permissible. In fact, religious accommodation would be in line
with the legislative approach to religion in the employment
context, a world where religious accommodation is not merely
permissible, but is required.138 Even if religious accommodation
in the housing context is out of line with the congressional
intent of the Fair Housing Act, the subsequent sections assert
that religious accommodation is necessary, at least in certain
situations. These situations exist where, like in the case at bar,
the rule in question has a disparate impact on one specific
religious group, observant Jews, and is therefore in violation of
both the First Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. In such
an instance, religious accommodation is necessary regardless of
whether the drafters of the Fair Housing Act envisioned the
law to operate in this way.
C.

Religious Accommodation and Title VII Employment
Claims

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employment
discrimination on the “basis of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin.”139 The Supreme Court has held that it is
constitutionally permissible for the government to order
employers, under this Act, to accommodate employees’ religious

137

See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 9, Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562
(7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376).
138
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006); see also EEOC, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
(2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/types/religion.html [hereinafter RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION].
This assertion builds off the previous section’s argument that religious accommodation is
in line with the congressional intent of the Fair Housing Act. See supra Part III.C.
139
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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needs.140 This section seeks to explain how religious
accommodation is handled under the Title VII mandate, and
argues that creating a similar requirement under Title VIII,
the Fair Housing Act, would function similarly and be
constitutionally permissible.
The Supreme Court has held that the Title VII religious
accommodation
requirement
does
not
violate
the
Establishment Clause, because it does not promote or advance
religion, but rather merely permits religious exercise.141 The
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), the agency responsible for enforcing Title VII and
investigating alleged violations of the statute, created the
religious accommodation requirement, which now requires that
“[e]mployers must reasonably accommodate employees’
sincerely held religious practices unless doing so would impose
an undue hardship on the employer.”142 The EEOC has defined
a religious accommodation to be “any adjustment to the work
environment that will allow the employee to practice his
religion.”143 Such adjustments include flexible scheduling, task
reassignments, and modification of grooming requirements and
agency policies, practices, and procedures, including permitting
religious expression.144 The only exception to this requirement is
if such an accommodation would “legitimately” harm the
interests of the business.145
The adoption of religious accommodation practices in
the housing context would be no more violative of the First
Amendment than would the parallel requirement in the
employment context, which the Supreme Court has long upheld
as constitutional.146 A religious accommodation requirement is
necessary to provide homeowners with the same protections
that the EEOC requirement of religious accommodation
provides to employees. Such an accommodation, as long as it is
tailored in a manner similar to Title VII, should not violate the
140

See Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (“This
Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must)
accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the
Establishment Clause.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987))).
141
See id.
142
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION, supra note 138.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
See Amos, 483 U.S. at 335.
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Establishment Clause. To the contrary, it would further the
goal of the Free Exercise Clause of preventing the burdening of
religious exercise,147 because such an accommodation would
enable homeowners to be free from the fear that they may be
constructively evicted from their homes due to rules that
inhibit their ability to practice their religion in their homes.
The Title VII religious accommodation requirement has
interpreted the word “religion” to include “all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief.”148 In order
to establish a religious accommodation claim under Title VII,
the claim must be assessed under a two-step framework.149
First, the claimant must establish a prima facie case by
proving that: (1) he has a “bona fide religious belief” that
conflicts with one or more of his employment duties; (2) he
informed the employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) as a
result of the conflict, he was subject to adverse employment
consequences.150 If all of these requirements are met, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that accommodation
would create an undue burden for the company.151
Employers
are
required
to
make
religious
accommodations for both employees and prospective employees,
so long as such an accommodation does not result in “undue
hardship.”152 However, the level of undue hardship necessary to
overcome the religious accommodation requirement is not
clear. The Ninth Circuit found in Garbers v. Postmaster
General that forcing an employer to pay extra overtime wages
was an undue hardship justifying the employer’s refusal to
provide a Baptist employee additional time off to attend
ministerial meetings twice a month.153 That court defined undue
hardship as “result[ing] in more than a de minimis cost to the
employer.”154 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that
when an employer takes reasonable steps to accommodate an
147

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 (1977).
149
Garbers v. Postmaster Gen., No. 94-15557, 1995 WL 241474, at *1 (9th Cir.
Apr. 24, 1995).
150
See id. at *1; see also Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., No. 96-2408, 1997 WL
741368, at *2-3 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1997).
151
Johnson, 1997 WL 741368, at *1; see also Garbers, 1995 WL 241474, at *1.
152
Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 74.
153
Garbers, 1995 WL 241474, at *1 (holding that having to pay 12% in
overtime constituted an undue burden to employer overcoming his duty to
accommodate employee’s religious beliefs).
154
Id. (citing Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1993)); see
also Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84.
148
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employee’s religious beliefs, the requirement may be met even
though no solution was ultimately found.155
In addition, employees may bring Title VII claims
alleging “constructive discharge.”156 Such a situation occurs
when “a reasonable person in the employee’s position would
have felt that he was forced to quit because of intolerable and
discriminatory working conditions.”157 This type of claim
requires a plaintiff to establish that the employer deliberately
created intolerable working conditions to compel the employee
to quit.158 Intent is demonstrated through evidence that the
employee’s resignation was a “reasonably foreseeable
consequence” of the employer’s failure to act when he becomes
aware of the condition.159
Under
Title
VII’s
framework
for
religious
accommodation, it appears that the Blochs’ claim of
discrimination would be strong enough to establish a violation.
Under the two-step framework, the Blochs have established a
prima facie case of discrimination, and there is no proof that
providing religious accommodation would cause any hardship
for the Shoreline Towers Condominium Association. First, the
Blochs have proven that they have a “bona fide religious belief”
that conflicts with the rule in question.160 The Jewish religion
requires that individuals display mezuzot in the doorways of
their homes at all times.161 The hallway rule that Shoreline
adopted in the spring of 2004 may be interpreted as including a
prohibition on the display of mezuzot on the exterior doors of
the condominiums.162 This rule necessarily interfered with the
Blochs’ practice of their religion, and the Blochs appropriately
155

See Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 78-79 (holding that no violation of
Title VII occurred where an airline provided a religious employee with multiple
alternatives to working on Saturdays, despite the fact that none were ultimately found
to be suitable; the Court found that the accommodation that the employee wanted
would have posed an undue burden, and because employee had been given
accommodating options, Title VII was not violated).
156
Garbers, 1995 WL 241474, at *1.
157
Id. at *2 (quoting Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th
Cir. 1987)); see also Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., No. 96-2408, 1997 WL 741368, at *3 (4th
Cir. Dec. 2, 1997) (defining constructive discharge as the situation where “an employer
deliberately makes the working conditions of the employee intolerable in an effort to
induce the employee to quit” (internal citations omitted)).
158
See Johnson, 1997 WL 741368, at *1.
159
Id.
160
See Garbers, 1995 WL 241474, at *1.
161
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
162
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood, J.,
dissenting) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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contacted Shoreline about the problem, providing them with
information explaining the religious significance of a
mezuzah.163 Finally, the Blochs suffered adverse consequences
as a result of the conflict between the hallway rule and their
religious practices.164 The Blochs suffered emotional distress as
a direct result of both this conflict and their internal struggle
between wanting to live in their home and adhering to the
tenets of their religion.165 Furthermore, there was no showing
that the condominium association would have suffered any
hardship at all,166 let alone an “undue hardship,” by
accommodating the religious beliefs of the Blochs and other
Jewish unit owners.167 The alleged goal of the hallway rule was
to “protect the appearance of the hallways,”168 and there was
neither a showing that this goal would be undermined by a
religious-accommodation exception to the rule, nor that the
condominium association would suffer any hardship as a
result.
The Shoreline Towers Condominium Association did not
even offer accommodation alternatives with which the Blochs
may have been satisfied.169 Instead, they entirely refused to
accommodate their religious beliefs.170 One tenant described the
163

Id. As the amicus brief submitted in support of Plaintiff-Appellants notes,
many Jews believe they are biblically required to place a mezuzah in the doorway of
their home because it is “a sacred piece of iconography meticulously presented in their
doorway in accordance with [G-d’s] law.” Brief of Amicus Curiae the Decalogue Society
of Lawyers in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562
(7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376) (“Because an observant Jew cannot live in a home without
a mezuzah, forcibly removing one from an adherent’s doorway is tantamount to
eviction.”).
164
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J., dissenting); see also Garbers, 1995 WL
241474, at *2-3.
165
See Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J., dissenting); Amended Complaint at
¶ 41-42, Bloch v. Frischholz (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 06 C 4472).
166
While arguably Shoreline Towers Condominium Association could assert
that mezuzot are not aesthetically pleasing, and thus cause the Association hardship, it
seems unlikely that a court could legitimately characterize aesthetic concerns as
excessive enough to warrant being deemed “undue hardship.” Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). This seems especially true in light of
seriousness that the Supreme Court has required in order to show that an
accommodation poses “undue hardship,” that is, proof that the accommodation would
pose “more than a de minimis cost” to the accommodator. See id.
167
Id.
168
Response Brief of the Defendants-Appellees at 9, Bloch v. Frischholz, 533
F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376).
169
See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
170
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 568 (Wood, J., dissenting). In September 2004, Lynne
Bloch approached the condominium board with a proposed amendment to the hallway
rule that would allow the display of religiously-mandated objects, including mezuzot, on
the doorframes, but her proposal was rejected. Id.
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effect of the rule on her life by stating that she had “essentially
been evicted from her home.”171 This allegation of constructive
eviction is analogous to claims of constructive discharge, which
are actionable under Title VII.172 Here, observant Jewish
condominium owners were placed in a situation where they felt
forced to move out of their homes because of intolerable
discriminatory housing practices.173 Just as such a claim would
be actionable under Title VII, a similar remedy should be
available for individuals who are placed in an analogous
situation by discriminatory housing practices.
The constitutionality of the religious accommodation
requirement of Title VII has been established.174 Creating a
similar requirement for Title VIII, the Fair Housing Act, would
similarly pass the First Amendment’s requirements of neither
promoting nor advancing religion, and would foster the free
exercise of religion. As discussed, if an analogous framework
were in place for assessing violations of the Fair Housing Act
as is in place for determining whether violations of Title VII
have occurred, the Blochs could potentially have two causes of
action. First, it seems that the Blochs would easily be able to
make out a prima facie case of discrimination that the
defendants would be unable to overcome by proof of undue
hardship. In addition, the hallway rule resulted in constructive
eviction of Jewish condominium owners because they can no
longer display their mezuzot, in accordance with the tenets of
their religion.175 As a result, constructive eviction could
potentially be an independent cause of action as well.176
Creating a religious accommodation requirement for the Fair
Housing Act would properly allow discrimination in the
housing market to be overcome by the most fair and efficient
means possible. The religious accommodation requirement has
fostered non-discrimination in the employment context as

171

Id.
See Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., No. 96-2408, 1997 WL 741368, at *1 (4th Cir.
Dec. 2, 1997).
173
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 568 (Wood, J., dissenting); see also Garbers, 1995 WL
241474, at *7-8.
174
Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
175
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
176
The Blochs’ potential constructive eviction claim referenced here would be
distinct from claims of constructive eviction under § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) of the Fair
Housing Act, discussed in Part III.A, as the claim here would stem from the Religious
Accommodation Clause for which this section advocates.
172
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efficiently as possible, and so too could such a requirement in
the housing market.
D.

The Seventh Circuit’s Failure to Reach Disparate Impact
Analysis

The Seventh Circuit further erred in analyzing the
situation presented in Bloch by failing to assess the disparate
impact that the hallway rule had on observant Jews. While the
court in Bloch I completely ignored the potential for a disparate
impact claim, in Bloch II the court explained that it believed
that the Blochs waived their ability to argue disparate impact,
because they did not raise it during the summary judgment
phase of the proceedings.177 The court acknowledged that the
Blochs used the term “disparate impact” in their pleadings and
cited the seminal case on disparate impact in their sur-reply,
but concluded that it was not enough to entitle them to
disparate impact analysis on their claims.178 However, if the
court had reached the Blochs disparate impact claim and
looked at Fair Housing Act and First Amendment
jurisprudence, it would have become clear that the Blochs had
a legitimate disparate impact claim since the hallway rule had
a disparate impact on Jewish residents, substantially
burdening their ability to freely practice their religion, without
any legitimate reason for doing so. In deciding that the Blochs
waived their disparate impact claims, both Seventh Circuit
decisions never engaged in enough analysis to recognize that
clear issues of material fact existed as to the disparate impact
of the hallway rule on observant Jews.179
A Fair Housing Act violation can be established by a
showing of disparate impact or disparate treatment.180
177

Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 784 (7th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 784-85 (“Accordingly, we conclude that the Blochs waived any
Arlington Heights disparate impact argument. So the Blochs must proceed on a
showing on intentional discrimination.”).
179
By limiting the remanded case to the issue of intentional discrimination
and not allowing the Blochs to proceed on the additional claim of disparate impact, one
of their potential avenues of relief was made unavailable to them.
180
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-35
(2d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); see also Hack v. President of Yale Coll., 237
F.3d 81, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2000) (Moran, J. dissenting) (noting that “the existence of
disparate impact claim under Title VIII was implicitly confirmed when the Supreme
Court announced its decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing
Development Corporation.”) (citing 429 U.S. 252 (1977)). The circuits, however, are not
in agreement as to whether mere proof of disparate impact alone is enough to establish
a Fair Housing Act violation. While some circuits have found violations of the Act in
178
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Similarly, a violation of the First Amendment may also be
established by showing that a rule is facially discriminatory or
has a disparate impact on one or more religious groups.181 Proof
of disparate impact requires a totality of circumstances
analysis, for example, an investigation into the background of
the decision, the sequence of events leading up to the decision,
and the factors the decision-maker considered.182 In order to
prove discriminatory impact under the Fair Housing Act, there
must be a showing that the ultimate effect of the law or rule is
disproportionately placed on one group.183 If discriminatory
impact is present but discriminatory intent cannot be readily
proven, the analysis of whether the rule is discriminatory
under the Fair Housing Act becomes more complicated.
Although Fair Housing Act claims are dramatically easier to
prove when both discriminatory intent and effect can be shown,
violations of Title VII, as discussed, are often established based
on evidence of discriminatory impact, even without a showing
of discriminatory intent.184 Thus, whether the additional
requirement of proving discriminatory intent is necessary for
establishing a violation of the Fair Housing Act, or for
establishing whether the conduct is in violation of the First
Amendment, must be assessed.
Under the Fair Housing Act, when discriminatory effect
can be established but discriminatory intent cannot, a claim
that a violation has occurred is not necessarily void. Instead, it
just becomes much more difficult to prove.185 The Act requires
that in order for a violation to be found in such a case, the
the absence of proof that the defendant intended to discriminate, others have found
effect alone to be insufficient. Compare Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 93435, with Dirden v. Dep’t. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 86 F.3d 112, 114 (8th Cir. 1996) (“To
prevail on a claim under . . . . the Fair Housing Act . . . a plaintiff must prove
th
discriminatory intent.”) and Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1534 (7 Cir.
1990) (“But discriminatory effect is not . . . the violation; it is merely evidence of
violation.”).
181
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 53338 (1993).
182
See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68.
183
United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir.
1974) (holding that discriminatory effect was established where an ordinance led to
foreclosure for 85 percent of the African Americans living in the area).
184
United States v. City of Chi., 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing
Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976)).
185
See City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d at 1186; see also supra note 180. But
see Hack, 237 F.3d at 96-97 (Moran, J. dissenting) (citing Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir. 1977) and noting that the Third Circuit has held that
proof of discriminatory effect alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act).
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claimant must establish that the action was taken “because of
religion.”186 The broad view of this requirement is that an action
can be shown to have been taken on the basis of religion
wherever claimant can prove that the “natural and foreseeable
consequence” of the action is discrimination, regardless of
intent.187 The narrow view, however, is that in order to meet
this requirement, intent needs to actually be proved.188 Even
after this requirement is met, some courts proceed to consider
four factors to fully determine whether a violation of § 3604(a),
the section prohibiting discrimination in the sale and rental of
dwellings, has occurred.189 The factors to be assessed are: (1) the
strength of the showing of the discriminatory effect; (2)
whether there is any showing of discriminatory intent at all; (3)
the defendant’s interest in taking the action; and (4) whether
the plaintiff is looking to get the court to make an affirmative
holding that the defendant must provide housing for minorities
or whether he seeks merely to prevent the defendant from
interfering with the right of individual property owners.190
First Amendment analysis of whether facially neutral
laws are discriminatory on the basis of religion is approached
differently. Facially neutral laws are assessed under a
rationality standard: does the rule infringe on the free exercise
of religion?191 Even if a facially neutral law of general
applicability does infringe on religious practice, the Supreme
Court has only applied strict scrutiny where other
constitutional protections were at issue as well,192 or where it
could be shown that the rule was not actually “neutral,”
because its object was “to infringe upon or restrict practices.”193
186

See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding discriminatory effect in the absence of discriminatory
intent in the case of zoning ordinances prohibiting the construction of federally
financed low-income housing); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
187
See id. at 1288.
188
See id.
189
See id. at 1290.
190
Id.
191
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
192
See id. at 881-82 (citing numerous cases including West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (deeming a statute compelling students to salute
the flag to be unconstitutional when challenged by religious objectors); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 206 (1972) (invalidating compulsory schooling laws as applied to
Amish Parents who objected on religious grounds after the Court upheld the right of
parents to direct the education of their children in Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925))).
193
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993).
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Congress, however, did not approve of the rational basis test,
and voiced its disapproval by passing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).194
RFRA prevented the government from “substantially
burdening” religious practice even where the burden resulted
from a generally applicable rule.195 The exception to this was
that if the government could demonstrate that the burden was
in furtherance of a “compelling government interest,” and that
the restriction was the least restrictive means of achieving the
interest, then the rule could be upheld.196 One of the stated
goals of RFRA was to provide a cause of action for people whose
religious exercise was unnecessarily burdened by the
government.197 The Supreme Court, however, struck down
RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores,198 holding that the law created
a separation of powers issue because it exceeded Congress’
remedial powers.199
In a second attempt to remedy what Congress saw as an
injustice in denying individuals the rights guaranteed to them
by the First Amendment, Congress passed the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).200 This Act
was also constitutionally challenged, but the Supreme Court
upheld the statute,201 exemplifying the fact that religious
accommodation statutes do not automatically violate the
Establishment Clause. RLUIPA is a narrower version of RFRA
that prohibits the government from imposing “substantial”
burdens on the religious exercise of any institutionalized
individual unless there is a compelling government interest
and the restriction is the least restrictive means of achieving
the interest.202 In the face of allegations that RLUIPA
194

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (1993) (this statute’s application to local and
state governments was later declared unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997)).
195
Id. § 2000bb.
196
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16 (discussing the intent of RFRA
before deeming it unconstitutional).
197
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
198
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
199
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (noting that “RFRA contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance”); see
also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) (explaining that “this Court
invalidated RFRA as applied to States and their subdivisions, holding that the Act
exceeded Congress’ remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment”).
200
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 to -5.
201
See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719-26 (holding that the protections granted by
RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment Clause).
202
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2); see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712.
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effectively advanced religion, in conflict with the
Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court upheld the statute.
In Cutter v. Wilkinson,203 the Supreme Court found RLUIPA to
be constitutional because there was “no cause to believe
RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropriately balanced
way”204 given the “compelling governmental interest” exception,
and the fact that it “does not differentiate among bona fide
faiths.”205 The Court recognized RLUIPA to be a continuation of
“congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened
protection from government-imposed burdens, consistent with
this Court’s precedents.”206 Thus, the Supreme Court adeptly
observed Congress’ discontent with the limited protections that
the rationality standard advanced in Employment Division v.
Smith207 provided to religious individuals in the face of
governmental action stymieing individuals’ ability to practice
freely.208
In Bloch I, the Seventh Circuit found the hallway rule to
be neutral and generally applicable with respect to religion.209
Viewing the rule as facially neutral and seeing no requirement
for religious accommodation under the Fair Housing Act, the
court took their analysis no further.210 By stopping their
analysis at this early stage, the opinion failed to determine
whether the hallway rule had a disparate impact on
individuals of particular religious groups. The Bloch II court
recognized that while the hallway rule may have been neutral
when first adopted, the crux of the Blochs’ claim was that the
reinterpretation of the rule in 2004 was not neutral.211 Yet the
court never engaged in disparate impact analysis to address
this, and remanded the case only for determination of
intentional discrimination. But, violations of both the Fair
Housing Act and the First Amendment can be made by proving
that a disparate impact results from application of a facially

203

544 U.S. 709 (2005).
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.
205
Id. at 723.
206
Id. at 714.
207
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
208
See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714-15; Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
209
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
210
Id. at 564-65.
211
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009).
204
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neutral rule.212 Advanced analysis of the implications of the
hallway rule sheds light on the fact that perhaps disparate
impact analysis would have led to a different outcome.
Under Fair Housing disparate impact analysis, even if
we begin with the assumption that discriminatory intent is not
outwardly evident, when we look to the factors for determining
whether a violation has occurred, the answer appears to be
overwhelming.213 First, there is a strong showing of
discriminatory effect here as the hallway rule results in the
constructive eviction of Jewish residents since they can no
longer display their mezuzot.214 This effect is significant as it
inhibits observant Jews from living in the condominiums they
have purchased, and effectively creates a situation where the
Shoreline Towers Condominiums are able to exclude Jewish
residents. Second, discriminatory intent is not absent here.215
Rather, the record is replete with evidence of discriminatory
intent. The fact that the hallway rule was in place for three
years before the association decided to change its applicability
to include the display of mezuzot was clearly a targeted
action.216 The Association began to remove and confiscate
mezuzot without giving notice to the residents of the new
interpretation of the hallway rule, and continued this practice,
eventually culminating in a threat to the Blochs that affixation
of a mezuzah would result in a monetary penalty.217 In addition,
the fact that the display of mezuzot does nothing to inhibit the
stated goal of the hallway rule, to protect the hallways’
appearance,218 is further evidence of the rule’s discriminatory
intent.

212

See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
534 (1993); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-35
(2d Cir. 1998), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
213
See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
214
See id.; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
215
See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290.
216
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 567 (Wood, J., dissenting), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 773
(“Though Frischholz knew as early as 2001 that removing mezuzot would be a problem
for Lynne Bloch, he made no effort to stop the staff from repeatedly tearing them down.
Instead, he accused Lynne of being a racist, called her a liar, encouraged other tenants
to vote against her reelection to the Association’s Board of Managers, and told her that
if she didn’t like the way the rules were enforced, she should ‘get out.’”).
217
Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 567.
218
Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 9, Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d
562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376).

2010]

FAIR HOUSING AFTER BLOCH

1439

To add insult to injury, the condominium association
removed the Blochs’ mezuzah after they requested special
permission to display one only for a limited time to conform to
the Jewish mourning rituals after the death of Marvin Bloch.
The condominium association’s action demonstrates that
another motivation, other than the hallway’s appearance, was
at issue.219 Finally, the fact that the condominium board
rejected a proposal to create a religious accommodation
amendment to the hallway rule, when such an amendment
would have no impact on the achievement of the rule’s purpose,
seems to indicate that they may have had an ulterior motive.
This rejection is additional evidence of the association’s
discriminatory intent in interpreting the hallway rule to
prohibit even the display of religiously-mandated objects.220
Looking to the final two factors,221 it seems clear that not
only did Shoreline lack an interest in taking this action, but
also that all the Blochs were seeking to achieve with their
lawsuit was to prevent interference with their individual
property rights. Shoreline cannot legitimately say that the
amendment proposed by the Blochs was objectionable on any
sound basis. If the hallway rule’s purpose really is simply to
protect the appearance of the hallways, then the display of
small religious objects such as a mezuzah does not contradict or
undermine this purpose in any way. This is a question of fact
that remained to be brought before a jury.222 Thus, the
defendants had no interest in taking this action.223 Finally, the
Blochs did not request that the Court require Shoreline to take
an affirmative action to provide housing for religious
minorities. Rather, they merely sought to protect their own
individual property rights, which they were prevented from
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Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps the worst episode,
and one that gives rise to a strong inference of anti-Semitic animus occurred while the
Blochs were mourning the death of Dr. Marvin Bloch, Lynne’s husband and Helen and
Nathan’s father.”).
220
Id. at 568.
221
See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
222
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants Urging Reversal and Remand on Fair Housing Act Claims at 37, Bloch v.
Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376) (explaining that “were the jury
to find that the Association’s actions were motivated in part by plaintiffs’ race or
religion, it does not matter that the Association acted under the aegis of neutral
Hallway Rule 1”).
223
See id.
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exercising.224 Given the analysis of these factors, a violation of
the Fair Housing Act has likely occurred, even without a
reading of the statute that requires religious accommodation,
because of the disparate impact of the hallway rule on
observant Jewish residents and the fact that HUD has
interpreted
the
Act
to
apply
to
post-acquisition
discrimination.225
Under the First Amendment, while the seemingly
facially neutral and generally applicable hallway rule at issue
in Bloch might initially be seen as a situation warranting only
rational-basis review,226 this superficial analysis oversimplifies
the complexity of the issues raised in the case. As the Supreme
Court’s decision in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah227 makes clear, strict scrutiny must be applied where
the purpose of a law is to impede the practice of religion.228 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia expounds on this, noting
that strict scrutiny is required where “laws which, though
neutral in their terms, through their design, construction, or
enforcement, target the practices of a particular religion for
discriminatory treatment.”229 That is precisely the type of rule
at issue here.230 The hallway rule, while neutral on its face, has
been enforced only to the detriment of observant Jews, who are
no longer free to display their mezuzot. Where the application
of a facially neutral law reveals religious animus and results in
disparate impact on only one religious group, the law can no
longer be deemed “neutral.”231 Thus, the Condominium
Association’s interpretation of the hallway rule to include a
prohibition on the display of mezuzot, combined with their
224

See id.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
226
See Employment Div., v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
227
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
228
Church of Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533 (“Although a law targeting
religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or
restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is
invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.” (internal citations omitted)).
229
Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring).
230
In fact, the Bloch II court recognized this as they cited to this case in their
discussion of intentional discrimination noting, “The First Amendment ‘forbids subtle
departures from neutrality’ and ‘covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.’”
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 785 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing
Church of Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 534). This statement, however, has heavy
implications for assessing just how “neutral and generally applicable” the hallway rule
actually is.
231
Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (majority opinion).
225
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continual removal of the Blochs’ mezuzah despite specific
requests to display it, demonstrate a potential religious
motivation behind the rule.232 The situation, therefore, warrants
strict scrutiny. When subject to that exacting standard, the
hallway rule would certainly fail to overcome the requirement
that the rule be justified by a compelling interest and narrowly
tailored to meet that interest.233 If the Association’s goal was
truly to rid the hallways of clutter, there are certainly less
restrictive ways of obtaining this result, including allowing for
a religious exception to the rule. It is likely then, that had the
Seventh Circuit looked beyond the face of the rule, it would
have realized that the situation at bar was analogous to that at
issue in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. and therefore
warranted a greater level of scrutiny and deeper analysis than
it was given.
In acting on its concern for the leniency with which the
constitutionality of laws that infringe on religion are assessed,
Congress passed legislation that limited the ability of the
government to infringe on individuals’ exercise of religion,
which was scrutinized by the Supreme Court and upheld.234 In
Cutter, the Supreme Court observed that RLUIPA does not
“elevate accommodation of religious observances over an
institution’s need to maintain order and safety . . .
accommodation must be measured so that it does not override
other significant interests.”235 It seems logical, therefore, that
there could be and should be a statutory requirement for
religious accommodation in housing as long as it does not
undermine a significant interest, for example, with a
compelling interest exception and without giving enhanced
privileges to one religion over another.236 Such a requirement
would not violate the Establishment Clause and would achieve
the objective of the Free Exercise Clause, allowing individuals
to freely practice their religions.237

232
233
234
235
236
237

See supra notes 214-219 and accompanying text.
Church of Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533.
See discussion of RLUIPA supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005).
See id. at 723-33.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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THE ROAD FORWARD: THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE
LEGISLATIVE ACTION

The Seventh Circuit’s cursory ruling in Bloch I
essentially opened the door for private housing associations to
arbitrarily create neutral and generally applicable238 rules that
only affect one group of people and, in doing so, effectively keep
protected classes out of their units. This result is in direct
conflict to the stated objectives of the Fair Housing Act, and if
taken to the extreme, could cause the nation to revert to
segregated housing systems like those that were predominant
at the time the statute was enacted.239 While the circuit
partially remedied these potentially devastating effects by
remanding the case for a determination on the issue of
intentional discrimination, the initial ruling is one that courts
in other circuits could easily follow and the courts’ denial of the
Blochs’ § 3604(a) claims still allows great leeway for housing
owners to subvert the spirit of the Fair Housing Act. The
decision, however, is not without remedy. In light of the harsh
consequences that this decision could have on the future of fair
housing in the United States, the state and federal legislatures
are in the best position to prevent religious discrimination in
housing of the type that plagued the Blochs. In fact, some
states have already begun to take action, which should
encourage other states to become involved in remedying the
potentially damaging consequences. In the face of judicial
decisions that have negative policy implications, the other
branches of government are the only bodies in a position to
curtail the effects of such decisions on the general welfare of
society.
In the past, when Congress has disapproved of judicial
interpretations of the Fair Housing Act and the First
Amendment, it has taken steps to overcome these decisions and
promote the ideals they originally sought to achieve.240 The
238

Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990)).
239
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
240
See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2006) (providing that “a member of the armed
forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform of the
member’s armed force” with only two exceptions—(1) item would interfere with
performance of military duty; or (2) if the item is determined not to be “neat and
conservative”), which Congress passed in response to Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986) superseded by statute, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989, Pub. L. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1086 (1987) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 774)
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Seventh Circuit’s holdings in Bloch I and Bloch II have
extreme policy implications for the future of private housing
associations and their ability to discriminate against particular
classes, namely religious groups. Since statutory law can
effectively prevent these harsh effects from becoming reality,
the legislature is in the best position to prevent the
discrimination in the housing market that could result from
this decision.241 Although the decision may be merely persuasive
in jurisdictions outside of the Seventh Circuit, there is no
reason why other jurisdictions will not follow the Seventh
Circuit’s lead in creating an incredibly low burden for
determining whether a Fair Housing Act or First Amendment
violation has occurred.242
The legislatures in some jurisdictions have already
taken action to prevent the effects of this decision from creating
a situation contrary to that envisioned by the drafters of the
Fair Housing Act. While the Bloch case was pending in the
district court, Chicago enacted an ordinance that prohibits
residential building owners from restricting the placement of
religious objects in the doorways of homes unless the individual
creating the restriction can prove that such a restriction is
necessary to avoid property damage or undue hardship to other
unit owners.243 Similarly, two years later, Illinois adopted a law
requiring
condominium
associations
to
reasonably
accommodate “religious practices, including the attachment of
religiously mandated objects to the front-door area of a
condominium unit.”244 Additionally, despite the fact that the
Bloch I decision was not binding precedent in New York,
legislators in the state have proposed a bill that would
effectively overturn the Bloch I decision and affirmatively

(holding that a prohibition on the wearing of headgear, including religiously-mandated
headgear, while on Air Force duty was constitutional; in response, Congress passed a
statute allowing religiously-mandated headgear to be worn while on duty which was
also deemed constitutional).
241
See 42 U.S.C. § 3601; see also Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d
1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973).
242
In fact, just months after the Seventh Circuit rendered its decision, Bloch
was cited by a district court in the Southern District of New York for the proposition
that, “creating a rule that equates failure to accommodate with discrimination would
be particularly inappropriate in the context of the FHA, which explicitly provides for
accommodation of handicap, but not race, sex or religion.” Ungar v. N.Y. City Hous.
Auth., No. 06-Civ.-1968, 2009 WL 125236, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2009).
243
See Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 564; CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE 05-8-030(H)
(2005).
244
See Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 564; 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.4(h) (2007).
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guarantee condominium owners the right to have religious
displays, including mezuzot, outside of their homes.245
Representative Jerrold Nadler, the voice behind the
proposed New York legislation, also brought the Freedom of
Religious Expression in the Home Act of 2008 (FREHA) before
the House of Representatives in September 2008,246 continuing
his crusade to voice disapproval with the Seventh Circuit’s
precedent-setting decision in Bloch I. The bill went before the
House, with twenty-four co-sponsors, but was never enacted
into law.247 If enacted, FREHA would have effectively addressed
the Blochs’ problem by “amend[ing] the Fair Housing Act to
prevent discrimination relating to the display of religious
symbols.”248 This proposed amendment to the Fair Housing Act
would allow individuals to display religious symbols in their
homes, unless prohibition on such displays was “reasonable
and necessary to prevent significant damage to property,
physical harm to persons, a public nuisance or similar undue
hardship.”249 On September 17, 2008, FREHA was referred to
the House Judiciary Committee, and currently remains a
potential source of relief for the near future.250
CONCLUSION
Bloch v. Frischholz brought to light the immense impact
that hasty decisions can have by setting important precedents
245

Josh Gerstein, A Nadler Bill Would Legalize Mezuzahs, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 19,
2008, available at http://www.nysun.com/national/a-nadler-bill-would-legalize-mezuzot/
86223/ (last visited July 12, 2009).
246
Freedom of Religious Expression in the Home Act of 2009. H.R. 6932,
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h6932ih.txt.pdf. The proposed Act was supported by
Representatives Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), Lamar Smith (R-TX), Robert Wexler (D-FL),
and Trent Franks (R-AZ). Inst. for Pub. Affairs, OU Applauds Introduction of
Legislation to Protect Homeowners’ Religious Rights, http://www.ou.org/public_
affairs/article/ou_applauds_introduction_of_legislation_to_protect_homeowners_religio
us_rig (last visited Jan. 25, 2009) [hereinafter OU Applauds Introduction of
Legislation]; see also Am. Jewish Congress, AJCongress Urges Congress to Overturn
Court Ruling Banning Right to Display Religious Symbols on Personal Property,
http://www.ajcongress.org/site/News2? page= News Article&id=6875 (last visited July
12, 2009).
247
Freedom of Religious Expression in the Home Act of 2009. H.R. 6932,
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h6932ih.txt.pdf.
248
Id.
249
OU Applauds Introduction of Legislation, supra note 246.
250
Freedom of Religious Expression in the Home Act of 2009. H.R. 6932,
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h6932ih.txt.pdf.
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with harsh realities. Although the Seventh Circuit attempted
to ameliorate the potentially devastating consequences that the
Bloch I decision could have had, the possibility of adverse
implications has not been dispelled. If the Blochs’ intentional
discrimination claim does not prevail on remand, then the
initial threat of condoning discriminatory housing practices,
which the Bloch I decision presented, still exists. Additionally,
regardless of the outcome on remand, the potential for this
result remains because the Bloch decision will be precedent in
just one circuit. Such a reality comes in spite of the existence of
the Fair Housing Act, which has promoted non-discriminatory
housing practices throughout the United States since its
enactment forty years ago. In the past, congressional action has
been, and continues to be, the best means of overcoming
judicial decisions that are contrary to the ideals of the nation.
Congress should explicitly create a narrowly tailored religious
accommodation clause in the Fair Housing Act. The legislative
intent of the Fair Housing Act seems to speak to the fact that
religious accommodation is necessary to achieve the ideals of
the Act. Further reference to the treatment of religious
accommodation under the First Amendment in parallel
contexts gives an indication of how such a requirement could be
developed in a way that would be both constitutionally
permissible and potentially further the goals of the Fair
Housing Act.
A
narrowly
tailored
religious
accommodation
requirement in the Fair Housing Act would not violate the
First Amendment. Rather, such a requirement would walk the
fine line between noninterference with religion, as required by
the Free Exercise Clause, and a separation of church and state,
as required by the Establishment Clause.251 The Supreme Court
itself has recognized that there is space for legislative action
that is not “compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.”252
This Note has argued that legislative action creating an
accommodation requirement under the Fair Housing Act falls
into this “space” and would be the most effective means of
overcoming and preventing the potential consequences of the

251
252

See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
Id.
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Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Bloch v. Frischholz.253 The
complementary goals of the Fair Housing Act and the First
Amendment have the ability to “ensure that all persons live
comfortably together in our pluralistic society and that all
persons have access to safe, decent, sanitary housing where
they can exercise their right to worship or not worship as they
choose.”254 With this exceptional ability right at our fingertips,
failing to achieve this ideal would wreak havoc on the progress
made since the enactment of the Fair Housing Act. The law
affords all citizens the ability to create change and live in a
nation where they are free from religious persecution and
discrimination. Upholding a decision that effectively subverts
this notion is unjust and divergent from the ideals upon which
this nation was founded.
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